Sacharuna Library

1.1 ÒDesire is what transforms Being, revealed to itself by itself in (true) knowledge, into an ÒobjectÓ revealed to a ÒsubjectÓ different from the object and ÒopposedÓ to it. It is in and byÐor better still asÐÓhisÓ Desire that man is formed and is revealedÐto himself and to othersÐas an I, as the I that is essentially different from, and radically opposed to, the non-I. The (human) I is the I of a Desire or of Desire./The very being of man, the self-conscious being, therefore, impliesand presupposes Desire. Consequently, the human reality can be formed and maintained only within a biological desire, an animal life. But, if animal Desire is the necessary condition of self-consciousness, it is not the sufficient condition. By itself, this Desire constitutes only the Sentiment of self./ In contrast to the knowledge that keeps man in a passive quietude, Desire dis-quiets him and moves him to action. Born of Desire, action tends to satisfy it, and can do so only by Ònegation,Ó the destruction, or at least the transformation, of the desired object: to satisfy hunger, for example, the food must be destroyed or, in any case, transformed. Thus, all action is Ònegating.Ó- Alexandre Kojeve. Introductin to the reading of Hegel

2.1 [...] The basic paradox of this Òtheory of Religion,Ó which posists the individual as a Òthing,Ó and a negation of intimacy, brings a powerlessness to light, no doubt, but the cry of this powerlessness is a prelude to the deepest silence. PP13

4.1 The immanence of the animal with respect to its mielieu is given in a presice situation, the importance of whic is fundamental[...] the situation is given when one animal eats another./ What is given when one animal eats another is alwaysthe fellow creature of the one that eats. It is in this sense that I speak of immanence. PP17

4.2 The animal that another animal eats is not yet given as an object. between the animal that is eaten and the one that eats, there is no relation of subordination like that connecting an object, a thing, to man, who refuses to be viewed as a thing. For the animal nothing is given through time. It is insofar as we are human that the object exists in time where its duration is perceptible. But the animal eaten by another exists this side of duration; it is consumed, destroyed, and this is only a disappearance in a world where nothin is posited beyond the present./ There is nothing in animal life that introduces the relation of the master to the one he commands, nothing that might establish autonomy on one side and dependence on the other. Animals, since they eat one another, are of unequal strength, butthere is never anything between them except that quantitative difference. PP18

4.3 Dependence and Independence of the animal. It is true that the animal, like the plant, has no autonomy in relation to the rest of the world. An atom of nitrogen,[...]or a molucule of water exist without needing anything from what surrounds them; they remain in a state of perfect immanence: there is never a necessity [...]. The immanence of a living organism in the world is very different: an organism seeks elements around it (or outside it) which are immanent to itand with which it must establish (relatively stabilize) relations of immanence. Already it is no longer like water in water. or if it is, this is only provided it manages to nourish itself. If it does not, it suffers and dies: the flow (the immanence) from outside to inside, from inside to outside, which is organic life, only lasts under certain conditions. PP20

5.1 The Positing of the Object: The Tool. The positing of the object, which is not given in animality, is in the human use of tools; that is. if the tools as middle terms are adapted to the intended resultÐif their users perfect them. Insofar as tools are developed with their end in view, consciousness posits them as objects, as interruptions in the indistinc continuity. The develped tool is the nascent form of the non-I. / The tool brings exteriority into a world where the subject has a part in the elements it distinguishes, where it hasa part in the world and remains Òlike water in water.Ó The element in which the subject has a partÐthe world, an animal, a plantÐis not subordinated to it (likewise, the subject cannot be subordinated, in an immediate sense, to the element with which it shares). But the tool is subordinated to the man who uses it, who can modify it as he pleases, in view of a particular report. PP27-PP28

5.2 The tool has no value in itself [...] but only in relation to an aticipated result. The time spent in making it directly establishes its utility, its subordination to the one who uses it with an end in view, and its subordination to this end; at the same time it establishes the clear distinction between the end and the means and it does so in the very terms that its appearance has defined. Un fortunately the end is thus given in terms of the means, in terms of utility. This is one of the most fateful aberrations of language[...]The stick digs the ground in order to ensure the growth of a plant; the plantis cultivated in order to beeaten[...]The absurdity of anendless deferral only justifies the equivalent absurdity of a true end, which would serve no purpose. What a Òtrue endÓ reintroduces is the continuous being, lost in the world like water is lost in water: or else, if it were a being as distinct as a tool, its meaning would have to be sought on the plane of utility, of the tool; it would no longer be a Òtrue endÓ.Only a world in which the beings are indiscriminately lost is superfluous, serves no purpose, has nothing to do: it only has a value in itself, not with a view to something else, this other thing for still another and so on. PP28-29

5.3 The object, on the contrary, has a meaning that breaks the undifferentiated continuity, that stands opposed to immanence or to the flow of all that isÐwhich it transcends. It is strictly alien to the subect, to the self still immersed inimmanence. It is the subjectÕs property, the subjectÕs thing, but is nonetheless impervious to the subject. PP29

5.4 The perfectÐcomplete clear and distinctÐknowledge that the subject has of the object is external;it results from manufacture*,I know what the object that I have made is; I can make another one like it, but I would not be able to make another being like me[...] as a matter of fact, I donÕt know what the being is that I am, nor do I know what the world is and I would not be able to produce another one by any means./ This external knowledge is perhaps superficial, but it alone is capable ofreducing manÕs distance from the objects that it determines. It makes of these objects, although they remain closed to us, that which is nearest and most familiar to us. PP30 [?] /*[...]The only means of freeing the manufactured object from the servility of the tool is art,understood as a true end. But art itself does not asa rule prevent the object it embellishes from being used[...] Few indeed are the objects that have the virtue of serving no function in the cycle of useful activity. PP30

5.5 The Positing of Immanent Elements in the Sphere ofObjecst. The positing of the objectknown clearly and distinctly from without generally defines asphere of objects, a world, a plane on which it is possible to situate clearly and distinctly, at least so it appears, that which in theory cannotbe known in the same way [Me: a dwelling place]. Thus having determined stable and simple things which it is possible to make, men situated on the same plane where the things appeared (as if they were comparable to the digging stick) elements that were and nonetheless remained continuous with the world, such as animals, plants, other men, and finally, the subject determinig itself. This means in other words that we do not know ourselves distinctly and clearly until the day we see ourselves from the outside as another. Moreover, this will depend on our having first distinguished the other on the plane where manufactured things have appeared to us distinctly. PP31

5.6 [...] In the end we perceive each appearance-subject (ourselves), animal, mind, worldÐfrom within and from without at the same time, both as continuity, with respect to ourselves, and as object. *PP31 *Ourselves, what existential philosophy calls, after hegel, for itself; the object is termed,[...] in itself.

5.7 Language defines, from one lane to another, the category of subject-object,of the subject considered objectively, clearly and disinctly known from the outside insofar as this is possible. But an objectivity of this nature clear as to the separate positing of one element, remains confused: that element keeps allthe attributes of a subject and an object at the same time. The transcendence of thetool and the creative faculty connected with its use are confusedly attributed to the animal, the plant, the meteor; they are also attributed to the entire world. * PP32 *If I try to grasp what my thought is designating at the moment when it takes the world as its object, once the absurdity of the orld as a separate object, as a thing analogous to the manufactured-manufacturing tool, has been foiled, this world remains in me as that continuity from inside to outside, from outside to inside, which I have finally had to discover: I cannot in fact ascribe to subjectivity the limit of myself or of human selves;I cannot limit it in any way.

5.8 THE POSITING OF THINGS AS SUBJECTS. THE FIRST CONFUSION BEING ESTABLISHED, A PLANE OF SUBJECTSÐOBJECTS BEING DEFINED, THE TOOL can itself be regarded as a subject-object. It then receives the attributes of the subject and takes its place next to those animals,[...]plants, [...]meteors, or those men that the objectÕs transcendence, ascribed to them, withdraws from the continuum. It become continuous with respect to the world as a whole but it remainsseparate as it was in the mind of the one who made it: at the moment that suits him, a man can regard this onject, an arrowsay, as his fellow being, without taking away the operative power and transcendenceof the arrow. One could even say that an object thus transposed is not different, in the imagination of the one who conceives it, from what he himself is: this arrow, in his eyes, is capable of acting, thinking, and speaking like him. PP33

5.9 The Supreme Being. If we now picture men conceivingthe world in the light of an existence that is continuous (in relation to their intimACY, THEIR DEEP SUBJECTIVITY), WE MUST ALSO PERCEIVE THE NEED FOR THEM TO ATTRIBUTE TO IT THE VIRTUES OF A THING ÒCAPABLE OF ACTING, THINING, AND SPEAKINGÓ (JUST AS MEN DO). IN THIS reduction to a thing, the world is given both the form of an isolated individuality and creative power. But this personally distinct power has at the same time the divine character of a personal, indistinct, and immanent existence./ In a sense, the world is still,in a fundamental way, immanence without a clear limit (an indistinct flow of being into being[...]). So the positing, in the world, of a Òsupreme being,Ó distinct and limited like a thing, is first of all an impoverishment. There is doubtless, in the invention of a supreme being, a determination to define a value greater than any other. But thisdesire to increase results in a diminution. The objective personality of the supreme being situates it in the world next to other personal beings of the same nature [...] There is no ultimate equality between them. By definition, the supremebeing has thehighest rank. But all are of the same kind, in which immanence and personality are mingled; all can be divine and endowed with an operative power; all can speak the language of man. Thus, in spite of everything, they line up on a plane of equality. PP34

5.10 I am obliged to emphasize this aspect of unintentional impoverishment and limitation: nowadays Christians do not hesitate to recognize in the various Òsupreme beingsÓ of which ÒprimitivesÓ have kept some memory, a first consciousness of the God they believe in, but this nascent consciousness was not a blossoming forth; on the contrary, it was a kind of weakening of an animal sense without compensation. PP34

5.11 The Sacred. All peoples have doubtless conceived this supreme being, but the operation seems to have failed everywhere. The supreme being apparently did not have any prestige comparable to that which the God of the Jews, and later that of the Christians, was to obtain [Me:?].[...]There is every indication that the first menwere closer than we are to the animal world; they distinguished the animal from themselves perhaps, but not without a feeling of doubt mixed with terror and longing. The sense of continuity that we must attribute to animals no longer impressed itself on the mind unequivocally (the positing of distinct objects was in fact its negation). But it had derived a new significance from the contrast it formed to the world of things. This continuity, which for the animal could not be distinguished from anything else, which was in it and for it the only possible mode of being, offered man all the fascination of the sacred world, as against the poverty of the profane tool (of the discontinuous object). PP35

5.12 The sense of the sacred obviously is not that of the animal lost in the mists of continuity where nothing is distinct [...which] oppose[s] an opaque aggregate to a clear world[...]Moreover, the animal accepted the immanence that submerged it without aparent protest whereas man feels a kind of impotent horror in the sense of the sacred. This horror is ambiguous. Undoubtedly, what is sacred attracts and posseses an incomparable value, but at the same time it appears vertiginously dengerous for that clear and profane world where mankind situates its priviledged domain. PP36

5.13 The Spirits and the Gods. The equality and inequality of these varius existences, all opposed to the things that pure objects are, resolves into a hierarchy of spirits. Men and the supreme being, but also, in afirst representation, animals, plants, meteors...are spirits. A scale is built into this conception: the spirit of a dead man does not depend on a clear material reality like that of a living one; finally, the connection of the animal and plantspirit [...] with an individual animal or plant is very vague: such spirits are mythicalÐindependent of the given realities. Under these conditions, the hierarchy of spirits tends to be based on a fundamental distinction between spirits that depend on a body, like those of men, and of the autonomous spirits of the supreme being, of animals, of dead people, and so on, which tend to form a homogenous world, a mythical world, within which the hierarchical differenes are usually slight.The supreme beingm the sovereign deity, the god of heaven, is generally only a more powerful god of the same nature as the others./The gods are simply mythical spirits, without any substratum of reality. Thespirit that is not subordinated to the reality of a mortal body is a god, is purely divine (sacred). Insofar as he is himself a spirit, man is divine (sacred), but he is not supremely so, since he is real. PP37

5.14 The positing of the World of Things and of the Body as a Thing With the positing of a thing, an object, atool[...]the world in which men move about is still, in a fundamental way, a continuity from the subjectÕs point of view. but the unreal world of sovereign spirits or gods establishes reality, wich it is not,as its contrary. The reality of a profane world, of a world of things and bodies, is established opposite a holy and mythical world. PP37

5.15 Within the limits of continuity, everything is spiritual; there in no opposition of the mind and the body[...] Only starting from the mythical representation ofautonomous spirits does the body find itself on the side of things, insofar as it is not present in sovereign spirits. The real world remains as a residuum of the birth of the divine world: real animals and plants separated from their spiritual truth slowly rejoin the empty objectivity of tools; the mortal body is gradually assimilated to themass of things. Insofar as it is spirit, the human reality is holy, but it is profane insofar as it is real. Animals, plants, tools, and other controllable things form a real world with the bodies that controll them, a world subject to and traversed by divine forces, but fallen. PP38

5.16 The Eaten Animal, the Corppse, and the Thing The definition of the animal as a thing has become a basic human given [except for those who hold it sacred?]. The animal has lost its status as manÕs fellow creature, and man perceiving the animality in himself, regards it as a defect. There is [in this] a measure of falsity[...] An animal exists for itself and in order to ba thing itmust be dead or domesticated. Thus the eaten animal can be posited as an object only provided it is eaten dead. Indeed it is fully a thing only in roasted, grilled, or boiled form.[...]In any case the human attitude towards the body is formidably complex. Insofar as he is a spirit, it is manÕs misfortune to have the body of an animal and thus to be like a thing, but it is the glory of the humanbody to be the substratum of a spirit. And the spirit is so closely linked to the body as a thing that the body never ceases to be haunted, is never a thing except virtually, so much so that if death reduces it to the condition of a thing, the spirit is moe present than ever: the body that has betrayed it reveals more clearly than when it served it. In a sense thecorpse is the most complete affirmation of thespirit. What deathÕs definitive impotence and absence reveals is the very essence of the spirit, just as the scream of the one that is killed is the supreme affirmation of life. Conversely, manÕs corpse reveals the complete reduction of the animal body, and therefore the living animal, to thinghood. In theory the body is a strictly subordinate element, which is of no consequence for itselfÐa utility of the same nature as canvas, iron or lumber. PP40

5.17 The Worker and the Tool. Generally speaking, the world of things is perceived as a fallen world. It entails the alienation of the one who created it. This is the basic principle: to subordinate is not only to alter the subordinated element but to be altered oneself. The tool changes nature and man at the same time: it subjugates nature to man, who makes and uses it, but it ties man to subjugated nature. nature becomes manÕs property but it ceases to be immanent to him. it is his on condition that it is closed to him. if he places the world in his power, this is to the extent that he forgets that he is himself the world: he denies the world but it is himself that he denies. [...] The grain of wheat is a unit of agricultural production; the cow is a head of livestock, and the one who cultivates the wheat is A FARMER; THE ONE WHO RAISES THE STEER IS A STOCK RAISER. NOW, during the time when he is cultivating, the farmerÕs purpose is not his own purpose, and during the time when he is tending stock...The agricultural product and the livestrock are things, and the farmer and the stock raiser during the time they are working, are also things. All this is foreign to the immanent immensity, where there are neither separations nor limits. In the degree that he is the immanent immensity, that he is being, that he is of the world, man is a stranger for himself. The farmer is not a man: he is the plow of the one who eats the bread. At the limit, the act of the eater himself is already agricultural labor, to which he furnishes the energy. PP42

6.1 The Need That Is Met by Sacrifice and Its Principle . The first fruits of the harvest [...]are sacrificed in order to remove the plant [...],together with the farmer[...], from the world of things. PP43

6.2 The principle of sacrifice is destruction, but though it sometimes goes do far as to destroy completely (as in a holocaust), the destruction that sacrifice is intended to bring about is not annihilation. The thingÐonly the thingÐis what sacrifice means to destroy in the victim. Sacrifice destroys an objectÕs real ties of subordination; it draws the victim out of the world of utility and restores it to that of unintelligible caprice. When the offered animal enters the circle in which the priest will immolate it, it passes from the world of things which are closed to man and are nothing to him, which he knows from the outsideÐto the world that is immanent to it, intimate, known as the wife is known in sexual consumption[...]This assumes that it has ceased to be separated from its own intimacy, as it is in the subordination of labor. The sacrificerÕs prior separation from the world of things is necessqary for thereturn to intimacy, of immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object. The sacrificer needs the sacrifice in order to separate himself from the world of things and the victim could not be separated from it in turn if the sacrificer was not already separated in advance. The sacrificer declares: ÒInimately, I belong to the sovereign world of the gods and of myths, to the world of violent and uncalculated generosity, just as my wife belongs to my desires. I withdraw you, victim, from the world in which you were and could only be reduced to the condition of a thing, having a meaning that was foreign to your intimate nature. I call you back to the intimacy of the divine world, of the profound immanence of all that is. PP44

6.3 The Ordinary Association of Death and SacrificeThe puerile unconsciousness of sacrifice even goes so far that killing appears as a way of redressing the wrong done to the animal, miserably reduced to the condition of a thing. As a matter of fact, killing in the literal sense is not necessary. But the greatest negation of the real order is one most favorable to the appearance of a mythical order. Moreover, savrificial killing resolves the painful antinomy of life and death by means of a reversal. In fact death is nothing in immanence, but because it is nothing, a being is never truly separated from it. because death has no meaning, because there is no difference between it and life, and there is no fear of it or defense against it, it invades everything without givig rise to any resistance.PP45

6.4 Duration ceases to have any value, or it is there only in order to produce the morbid delectation of anguish. On the contrary, the objective and in a sense transcendent (relative to the subject) positing of the world of things has duration as its foundation: no thing in fact has a separate exitence, has a meaning, unless a subsequent time is posited, in view of which it is constituted as an object. The object is defined as an operative power only if its duration is implicitly understood.[...] Future time constitutes this real world to such a degree that death no longer has a place in it. But it is for this very reason that death means everything to it. The weakness (the contradiction) of the world of things is that it imparts an unreal character to death even though manÕs membership in this world is tied to the positing of the body as a thing insofar as it is mortal. PP46

6.5 As a matter of fact, that is a superficial view. What has no place in the world of things, what is unreal in the real world is not exactly death. death actually discloses the imposture of reality,not only in that the absence of duration gives the lie to it, butabove all because death is the great affirmer, the wonder-struck cry of life. The real order does not so much reject the negation of life that is death as it rejects the affirmation of intimate life, whose measureless vilence is a danger to the stability of things, an affirmation that is fully revealed only in death. The real order must annulÐneutralizeÐ that intimate life and replace it with the thing that the individual is in the society of labor. But it cannot prevent lifeÕs disappearance in death from revealing the invisible brillance of life that is not a thing. The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life, that lifeÕs intimacy does not reveal its dazzling consumption until the moment it gives out. No one knew it was there when it was; it was overlooked in favor of real things: death was one real thing among others. But death suddenly shows that the real society was lying. Then it is not the loss of the thing, of the useful member, that is taken into consideration. What the real society has lost is not a member, but raher its truth. That intimate life, which had lost the ability to fully reach me, which I regard primarily as a thing is fully restored to my sensibility through its absence. Death reveals life in its plenitude and dissolves the real order. Henceforth it matters very little that this real order is the need for the duration of that which no longer exists. When an element escapes its demands, what remains is not an entity that suffers bereavement; all at once that entity, the real order, has completely dissipated. There is no more question of it and what death brings in tears is the useless consumption of the intimate order. PP47

6.6 It is a naive opinion that links death closely to sorrow. The tears of the living, which respond to its coming, are themselves far from having a meaning opposite to joy. Far from being sorrowful, the tears are the expression of a keen awareness of shared life grasped in its intimacy. it is true that this awareness is never keener than at the moment when absence suddenly replaces presence, as in death or mere separation. And in this case, the consolation [...] is in a sense bitterly tied to the fact that it cannot last, but it is precisely the disappearance of duration, and of the neutral behaviours associated with it, that uncovers a ground of things that is dazzingly bright (in other words, it is clear that the need for duration conceals life from us, and that, only in theory, the impossibility of duration frees us). In other cases the tears respond instead to unexpected triumph, to good fortune that makes us exult, but always madly, far beyond the concern for a future time. PP48

6.7 The Consummation of Sacrifice. [Sacrifice...]functions like death in that it restores a lost value through a relinquishment of that value. PP48

6.8 To sacrifice is not to kill but to relinquish and to give. Killing is only the exhibition of a deep meaning. What is important is to pass from a lasting order, in which all consumption of resources is subordinated to the need for duration, to the vilence of an unconditional consumption; what is important is to leave a world of real things, whose reality derives from a long term operation and never resides in the momentÐa world that creates and preserves (that creates for the benefit of a lasting reality). Sacrifice is the antithesis of production, which is accomplished with a view to the future; it is consumption that is concerned only with the moment. This is the sense in which it is gift and relinquishment, but what is given cannot be an object of preservation for the receiver: the gift of an offering makes it pass precisely into the world of abrupt consumption. PP49

6.9 [...] one sacrifices what is seful; one does not sacrifice luxurious objects[...] luxury has already destroyed [...]labor; it has dissipated it in vaiglory[...] To sacrifcice a luxury object would be to sacrifice the same object twice. PP50

6.10 But neither could one sacrifice that which was not first withdrawn from immanence, that which, never having belonged toimmanence, would not have been secondarily subjugated, domesticated and reduced to a thing. Sacrifice is made of objects that could have been spirits, such as animals or plant substances, but that have become things and that need to be restored to the immanence whence they comefrom, to the vague sphere of lost intimacy. PP50

6.11 The Individual, Anguish, and Sacrifice Intimacy cannot be expressed discursively./[...]What is intimate, in the strong sense, is what has the passion of an absense of individuality, the imperceptible sonority of a river,the empty liquidity of the sky:this is still a negative definition from which the essential is missing. PP50-51

6.12 Paradoxically, intimacy is violence, and it is destruction, because it is not compatible with the positing of the separate individual.If one describes the individual in the operation of sacrifice, he is defined by anguish. But if sacrifice is distressing, the reason is that the individual takes part in it. The individual identifies with the victim in the sudden movement that restores it to immanence (to intimacy), but the assimilation that is linked to the return to immanence is nonetheless based on the fact that the victim is the thing, just as the sacrificer is the individual. The separate individual is of the same nature as the thing, or rather the anxiousness to remain personally alive that establishes the personÕs individuality is linked to the integration of existence to the world of things. To put it differently, work and fear of dying are interdependent; the former implies the thing and viceversa. In fact, it is not even necessary to work in order to be the thing of fear: man is an individual to the extent that his apprehension ties him to the results of labor.But man is not, as one might think, a thing because he is afraid. He would have no anguish if he were not the individual (the thing), and it is essentially the fact of being an individual that fuels anguish. It is in order to satisfy the demands of the thing, it is insofar as the world of things has posited his duration as the basic condition of his worth, that he learns anguish. He is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things. Death disturbs the order of things, and the order of things holds us. man is afraid of the intimate order that is not reconciliable with the order of things. otherwise there would be no sacrifice, and there would be no mankind either. The intimate order would not reveal itself in the destruction and the sacred anguish of the individual. Because man is not squarely within that order, but only partakes of it through a thing that is threatened in its nature (in the projects that constitute it), intimacy, in the trembling of the individual, is holy, sacred, and suffused with anguish. PP52

6.13 The Festival The sacred is the prodigious effervesence of life that, for the sake of duration, the order of things holds in check, and that this holding changes into a breaking loose, that is, into violence. It constantly threatens to break the dikes, to confront productive activity with the precipitate and contagious movement of a purely glorious consumption. The sacred is exactly comparable to the flame that destroys the wood by consumng it. [...] Sacrifice burns like the sun that slowly dies of the prodigious radiation whose brillance our eyes cannot bear, but is never isolated and, in a world of individuals, it calls for the general negation of individuals as such. PP53

6.14 The divine world is contagious and its contagion is dangerous. In theory, what is started in the operation ofsacrifice is like the action of lightning:in theory there is no limit to the conflagration. It favors human life and not animality; the resistance to immanence is what regulates its resurgence, so poignant in tears and so strong in the unavowable pleasure of anguish. but if man surrendered unreservedly to immanence, he would fall short of humanity; he would achieve it only to lose it andeventually life would return to the unconscious intimacy of animals. The constant problem posed by the impossibility of being human without being a thing and of escapinghe limits of things without returning to animal slumber receives the limited solution of the festival. PP53

6.15 The initial movement of the festival is given in elementary humanity, but it reaches the plenitude of the effucion only if the anguished concentration of sacrifice sets it loose.The festival assembles men whom the consumption of the contagious offering (communion) opens up to a conflagration, but one that is limited by a countervailing prudence: there is an aspiration for destruction that breaks out in the festival, but there is a conservative prudence that regulates and limits it. On the one hand all the possibilities of consumption are brought together[...]. But consciousness, awake in anguish, is disposed, in a reversal commanded by an inability to go along with the letting loose, to subordinate it to the need that the order of things hasÐbeing fettered by nature and self-paralyzedÐ to receive an impetus from the outside. Thus the letting loose of the festival is finally, if not fettered, then at least confined to the limits of a reality of which it is a negation. The festival is tolerated to the extent that it reserves the necessities of the profane world. PP54

6.17 The festival is the fusion of human life. For the thing and the individual, it is thecrucible where distinctions melt in the intense heat of intimate life. But its intimacy is dissolved in the real andindividulized positing of the ensemble that is at stake in the rituals. For the skae of a real community, of a social fact that is given as a thingÐof a common operation in view of a future timeÐ the festival is limited: it is itself integated as a link in the concatenation of useful works. [...]its ritual movements slip into the world of immanence only through the mediation of spirits. To the spirits borne by the festival, to whom the sacrifice is offered, and to whose intimacy the victims are restored, an operative power is attributed in the same way it is attributed to things. In the end the festival itself is viewed as an operation and its effectiveness is not questioned. The possibility of producing, of fecundating the fields and the herds is given to rites whose least servile operative forms are aimed, through a concession, at cutting the losses from the dreadful vilence of a divine world. In any case, positively in fecundation, negatively in propitiation, the community first appears in the festival as athing, a definite individualization and a shared project with a view to duration. The festival is not a true return to immanence but rather theamicable reconciliation, full of anguish, between the incompatible necessities. PP55

6.18 Of course the community in the festival is not posited simply as an object, but more generally as a spirit (as a subject-object), but its positing has the value of a limit to the imanence of the festival and, for this reason the thing value is accentuated.PP56

6.19 So it is not humanity Ðinsofar as clear consciousness rightly opposes it to animalityÐrestored to immanence. The virtue of the festival is not integrated into its nature and conversely the letting loose of the festival has been possible only because of this powerlessness of consciousness to take it for what it is. The basic problem of religion is given in this fatal misunderstanding of sacrifice. man is the being that has lost, and even rejected, that which he obscurely is, a vague intimacy. Consciousness could not have become clear in the course of time if it had not turned away from its awkward contents, but clear consciousness is itself looking for what it has itself lost, and what it must lose again as it draws near to it. of course what it has lost is not outside it; consciousness turns away from the obscure intimacy of consciousness itself. Religion, whose essence is the search for lost intimacy, comes down to the effort of clear consciousness which wants to be a complete self-consciousness: but this effort is futile, since consciousness of intimacy is possible only at a level where consciousness is no longer an operation whose outcome implies duration, that is, at the level where clarity, which is the effect of the operation, is no longer given. PP57

6.21 A societyÕs individuality, which the fusion of the festival dissolves, is defined first of all in terms of real works[...] that integrate sacrifice into the world of things. But the unity of a group thus has the ability to direct destructive violence to the outside. PP57

6.22 As a matter of fact, external violence is antithetical to sacrifice or the festival, whose violence works havoc within. Only religion ensures a consumption that destroys the very substance of those who it moves. Armed action destroys others or the wealth of others. PP57

6.23 In deadly battles, in massacres and pillages, it has a meaning akin to that of festivals, in that the enemy is not treated as a thing. But war is not limited tothese explosive forces and, within these very limits, it is not a slow action as sacrifice is, conducted with a view to return to a lost intimacy. It is a disorderly eruption whose external direction robs the warrior of the intimacy he attains. And if it is true that warfare tends in its own way to dissolve the individual through a negative wagering of the value of his own life, it cannot help but enhance his value in the course of time by making the surviving individual the beneficiary of the wager. PP58

6.24 War determines the development of the individual beyond the individual-as-thing in the glorious individuality of the warrior. The glorious individual introduces, through a first negation of individuality, the divine order into a category of the individual (which expresses the order of things in a basic way). he has the contradictory will to make the negation of duration durable. Thus his strength is in part a strength to lie. War represents a bold advance, but it is the crudest form of advance:one needs as much naiviteÐor stupidityÐ as strength to be indiferent to that which one overvalues and to take pride in having deemed oneself of no value. PP58

6.26 [...] lthough he remains dimly aware of a calling that rules-out self-seeking behaVIOT OF WORK, THE WARRIOR REDUCES HIS FELLOW MEN TO SERVITUDE. HE THUS SUBORDINATES VIOLENCE TO THE MOST COMPLETE REDUCTION OF MANKIND TO THE ORDER OF THINGS. DOUBTLESS THE WARRIOR IS NOT THE INITIATOR OF THE REDUCTION. The operation that makes the slave a thing presupposes the prior institution of work. but the free worker was a thing voluntarily and for a given time. Only the slave, whom the military order has made a commodity, draws out the complete consequences of the reduction.[...] Thus the crude unconsciousness of the warrior mainly works in favor of the predominance of the real order. The sacred prestige he arrogates to himself is the false pretense of a world brought down to the weight of utility. The warriorÕs nobility is like a prostituteÕs smile, the truth of which is self-interest. PP59

6.28 The sacrifices of slaves illustrate the principle according to which what is useful is destined for sacrifice. Sacrifice surrenders the slave, whose slavery accentuates the degradation of the human order, to the baleful intimacy of unfetterd violence. PP60

6.29 In general, human sacrifice is the acute stage of a dispute setting the movement of a measureless violence against the real order and duration. It is the most radical contestation of the primacy of utility. It is at the same time the highest degree of an unleashing of internal violence. The society in which this sacrifice rages mainly affirms the rejection of a disequilibrium of the two violences. he who unleashes his forces of destruction on the outside cannot be sparing of his resources. if he reduces the enmy to slavery, he must, in a spectacular fashion, make glorious use of this new source of wealth. He must partly destroy these things that serve him, for there is nothing useful around him that can fail to satisfy, first of all, the mythial orderÕs demand for consumption. Thus, a continual surpassing toward destruction denies, at the same time that it affirms, the individual status of the group. PP60

6.30 But this demand for cosumption is brought to bear on the slave insofar as the latter is his property and histhing. It should not be confused with the movements of violence that have the outside, the enemy, as their object. In this respect the sacrifice of a slave is far from being pure. In a sence it is an extension of military combat, and internal violence, the essence of sacrifice, is not satisfied by it. Intense consumption requires victims at the top who are not only the useful wealth of a people, but this people itself; or at least, elements that signify it and that will be destined for sacrifice, this time not owing to an alienation of the sacred worldÐa fallÐ but, quite the contrary, owing to an exceptional proximity, such as the sovereign or the children (whose killing finally realizes the performance of a sacrifice twice over). PP61

6.31 One could not go further in the desire to consume the life substance. Indeed, one could not go more recklessly than this. Such an intense movement of consumption responds to a movement of malaise by creating greater malaise. it is not the apogee of a religious system, but rather the movement when it condemns itself: when the old forms have lost part of their virtue, it can maintain itself only through excesses, through innovations tha are too onerous. Numerous signs indicate that these cruel demands were not easily tolerated. trickery replaced the king with a slave on whom a temporary royalty was conferred.The primacy of consumption could not resist that of military force. PP61

8.1 From a Balance of Resources and Expenditures to the Accumulation of Forces with a View to Their Growth Human sacrifice testifies at the same time to an excess of wealth and to a very painful way of spending it. It generally led to the condemnation of the rather stable new systems whose growth was slight and in which the expenditure was commesurate with the resources. PP65

8.2 The military order put an end to the malaises that corresponded to an orgy of consumption. it organized a rational use of forces for the constant increase of power. The methodical spirit of conquest is contrary to the spirit of sacrifice and the military kings rejected sacrifice from the beginning. The principle of military order is the methodical diversion of violence to the outside. If violence rages within, it opposes that violence to the extent it can. And it subordinates the diversion to a real end. it does so in a general way. Thus the military order is contrary to the forms of spectacular violence that correspond more to an unbridled explosion of fury than to the rational claculation of effectiveness. it no longer aims at the greatest expenditure of forces, as an archaic social system did in warfare and festivals. The expenditure of forces continues, but it is subjectd to a principle of maximum yield: if the forces are spent, it is with a view to the acquisition of greater forces. ..The military order organizes the yield of wars into slaves, that of slaves into labor [no ritual slaughters to compensate]. It makes conquest a methodical operation, for the growth of an empire. PP66

8.3 Positing of an Empire as the Universal Thing. The empire submits from the start to the primacy of the real order. it posits itself essentially as a thing. it subordinates itself to the ends it affirms: it is the administration ofreason. But it could never allow another empire to exist at its frontier as an equal. Every presence around it is ordered relative to it in a project of conquest. In this way it loses the simple individualized character of the limited community. it is not a thing in the sense in which things fit into the order that belongs to them; it is itself the order of things and it is a universal thing. At this level the thing that cannot have a sovereign character cannot have a subordinate character either, since in theory it is an operation developed to the limit of its possibilities. At the limit, it is no longer a thing, in that it bears within it, beyond its intangible qualities, an opening to all that is possible. But in itself this opening is a void. it is only a thing at the moment it is undone, revealing the impossibility of infinite subordination. But it consumes itself in a sovereign way. For essentially it is always a thing, and the movement of consumption must come to it from the outside. PP67

8.4 Law and Morality. The empire, being the universal thing (whose universality reveals the void), insofar as its essence is a diversion of violence to the outside, necessarily develops the law that ensures the stability of the order of things. In fact, law gives the attacks against it the sanction of an external violence. PP67

8.5 Law defines obligatory relations of each thing (or of each individual-as-thing) with others and guarantees them by the sanction of public force. But here law is only a doublet of the morality that guarantees the same relations by the sanction of an internal violence of the individual. PP67

8.6 Law and morality also have their place in the empire in that they define a universal necessity of the relation of each thing with the others. But the power of morality remains foreign to the system based on external violence. Morality only touches this system at the border where law is integrated. And the connection of the one and the other is the middle term by which one goes from the empire to the outside, from the outside to the empire. PP68

9.1 The Positing of Dualism and the Shifting of the Borders of the Sacred and the Profane In a world dominated by the military order, moving toward universal empire from the start, consciousness is distinctly determined in the measured reflection of the world of things. And this autonomous determination of consciousness brings about, in dualism, a profound alteration in the representation of the world. PP69

9.2 Originally, within the divine world, the beneficient and pure elements opposed the malefic and impure elements, and both types appeared equally distant from the profane. But if one considers a dominant movement of reflective thought, the divine appears linked to purity, the profane to impurity. In this way a shift is effected starting from the premise that divine immanence is dangerous, that what is sacred is malefic first of all, and destroys through contagion that which it comes close to, that the beneficient spirits are mediators between the profane world and the unleashing of divine forcesÐand seems less sacred in comparison with the dark deities. PP70

9.3 This early shift sets the stage for a decisive change. Reflective thought defines moral rules; it prescribes universally obligatory relations between individuals and society, or between individuals themselves. These obligatory relations are essentially those that ensure the order of things. They sometimes take up prohibitions that were established by the intimate order (such as the one forbidding murder). But morality chooses from among the rules of intimate order. It sets aside, or at least does not support, those prohibitions that cannot be granted universal value, that clearly depend on a capricious liberty of the mythical order. And even if it gets part of the laws it decrees from religion, it grounds them, like the others, in reason; it links them to the order of things. Morality lays down rules that follow universally from the nature of the profane world, that ensure the duration without which there can be no operation. it is therefore opposed to the scale of values of the intimate order, which placed the highest value on that whose meaning is given in the moment. it condemns the extreme forms of the ostentatious destruction of wealth[...]. It condems in a general way, all useless consumption. But it becomes possible only when sovereignity, in the divine world, shifts from the dark deity to the white, from the malefic deity to the protector of the real order. in fact it presupposes the sanction of the divine order. In granting the operative power of the divine over the real, man had in practice subordinated the divine to the real. [Benjamin: No conformism]. He slowly reduced its violence to the sanction of the real order that morality constitutes, provided that the real order conforms, precisely in morality, to the universal order of reason. In reality, reason is the universal form of the thing (identical to itself) and of the operation (of action). Reason and morality united, both resulting from the real orderÕs necessities of preservation and operation, agree with the divine function that exercises a benevolent sovereignity over that order. They rationalize and moralize divinity, in the very movement where morality and reason are divinized. PP71

9.4 In this way there appear the elements of the world view that is commonly called dualism and that differs from the first representation, also based on a bipartition, by virtue of a shifting of boundaries and an overturning of values. PP71

9.5 In the first representation, the immanent sacred is predicated on the animal intimacy of man and the world, whereas the profane world is predicated on the transcendence of the object, which has no intimacy to which mankind is immanent. In the manipulation of objects and, generally, in relations with objects, or with subjects regarded as objects, there appear, in forms that are implicit but linked to the profane world, the principles of reason and morality. PP72

9.6 The sacred is itself divided: the dark and malefic sacred is opposed to the white and beneficient sacred and the deities that partake of the one or the other are neither rational nor moral. PP72

9.7 By contrast, in the dualist evolution the divine becomes rational and moral and relegates the malefic sacred to the sphere of the profane, The world of the spirit (having few connections with the first world of spiritsÐwhere the distinct forms of the object were joined to the indistinction of the intimate order) is the intelligible world of the idea, whose unity cannot be broken down. The division into the beneficient and the malefic is found again in the world of matter, where the tangible form is sometimes apprehensible (in its identity with itself and with its intilligible form, and in its operative power), and other times is not, but remains unstable, dangerous, and not completely intelligible, is only chance, violence, and threatens to destroy the stable and operative forms. PP72

9.8 The Negation of the Immanence of the Divine and its Positing in the Transcendence of Reason. The moment of change is given in a passage: the intellegible sphere is revealed in a transport, in a sudden movement of transcendence, where tangible matter is surpassed. The intellect or the concept, situated outside time, is defined as a sovereign order, to which the world of things is subordinated, just as it subordinated the gods of mythology. In this way the intelligible world has the appearance of the divine. PP73

9.9 But its transcendence is of a different nature from the inconclusive transcendence of the divine of archaic religion. The divine was initially grasped in terms of intimacy (of violence, of the scream, of being in eruption, blind and unintelligible, of the dark and malefic sacred); if it was transcendent, this was in a provisional way, for man who acted in the real order but was ritually restored to the intimate order. This secondary transcendence was profoundly different from that of the intelligible world, which remains forever separated from the world of the senses. The transcendence of a more radical dualism is the passage from one world to the other. More exactly, it is the leaving of the world, periodÐfor, opposite the sensuous world, the inteligible world is not so much a different world as it is outside the world. PP73-74

9.10 But man of the dualistic conception is opposite to archaic man in that there is no longer any intimacy between him and this world. This world is in fact immanent to him but this is insofar as he is no longer characterized by intimacy, insofar as he is defined by things, and he is himself a thing, being a distinctly separate individual. Of course archaic man did not continually participate in the contagious violence of intimacy, but if he was removed from it, the rituals always kept the power to bring him back to it at the proper time. At the level of the dualistic conception, no vestige of the ancient festivals can prevent reflective man, whom reflection constitutes, from being, at the moment of his fulfillment, man of lost intimacy. Doubtless intimacy is not foreign to him; it could not be said that he knows nothing of it, since he has a recollection of it. But this recollection sends him outside a world in which there is nothing that responds to the longing he has for it. In this world even things, on which he brings his reflection to bear, are profoundly separated from him, and the beings themselves are maintained in their incommunicable individuality. This is why for him transcendence does not at all have the value of a separation, but rather of a return. No doubt it is inaccesible, being transcendence: in its operation it establishes the imposssibility, for the operator, of being immanent to the outcome of the operation. But while the individual that he is cannot leave this world or connect himself with that which goes beyond his own limits, he glimpses in the sudden awakening that which cannot be grasped but which slips away precisely as a Deja-vu. For him this deja-vu is utterly different from that which he sees, which is always separated from himÐand for the same reason from itself. It is that which is intelligible to him, which awakens the recollection in him, but which is immediately lost in the invasion of sensory data, which reestablish separation on all sides. This separate being is precisely a thing in that it is separated from itself: it is the thing and the separation, but self is on the contrary an intimacy that is not separated from anything (except that which separates itself from this intimacy, thus it, and with it the whole world of separate things). PP75

9.11 The Rational Exclusion of the Tangible World and the Violence of Transcendence. A great virtue in the paradox of transcendence of intimacy results from the complete negation of the given intimacy that transcendence is. For the given intimacy is never anything but a contrary of intimacy, because to be given is necessarily to be given in the way that a thing is. It is already to be a thing whose intimacy is necessarily separated from it. The intimacy escapes itself in the movement in which it is given. In fact it is in leaving the world of things that the lost intimacy is regained. But in reality the world of things is not the world by itself and pure transcendence toward pure intelligibility (which is also, glimpsed all at once, in the awakening, a pure unintelligibility) is, within the sensuous world, a destruction at once too complete and impotent. PP76

9.12 Doubtless the destruction of the thing in the archaic world had an opposite virtue and impotence. it did not destroy the thing universally by a single operation; it destroyed the thing taken in isolation, by the negation that is violence, that is impersonally in the world.. Now in its negation the movement of transcendence is no less opposed to violence than it is to the thing that violence destroys. The preceding analysis clearly shows the timidity of that bold advance. It undoubtedly has the same intention as archaic sacrifice, which is, following ineluctable destiny, at the same time to lift and to preserve the order of things. but if it lifts that order, it is by raising it to the negation of its real effects: the transcendence of reason and morality gives sovereignity, against violence (the contagious havoc of an unleashing), to the sanction of the order of things. Like the operation of sacrifice, it does not condemn, in themselves, the limited unleashings of de facto violence, which have rights in the world next to the order of things, but defines them as evil as soon as they place that order in danger. PP76

9.13 The weakness of sacrifice was that it eventually lost its virtue and finally established an order of sacred things, just as servile as that of real objects. The deep affirmation of sacrifice, the affirmation of a dangerous sovereignity of violence, at least tended to maintain an anguish that brought a longing for intimacy to an awakened state, on a level to which violence alone has the force to raise us. But if it is true that an exceptional violence is released in transcendence at the moment of its movement, if it is true that it is the very awakening of possibilityÐprecisely because so complete a violence cannot be maintained for longÐ the positing of a dualistic awakening has the meaning of an introduction to the somnolence that follows it. PP77

9.14 The dualism of transcendence is succeeded by the sleepy positing [(...which only sleep helps one to tolerate)] of the worldÕs division between two principles, both included in this world, of which one is at the same time that of good and the mind, and the other that of evil and matter. Hence there is given, without opposition, an empire of the real order that is a sovereignity of servitude. A world is defined in which free violence has only a negative place. PP77

10.1 The General Weakness of Moral Divinity and the Strength of Evil Pre cisely because awakening is the meaning of dualism, the inevitable sleep that follows it reintroduces evil as a major force. The flatness to which a dualism without transcendence is limited opens up the mind to the sovereignity of evil which is the unleashing of violence. The sovereignity of good that is implied by the awakening and realized by the sleep of dualism is also a reduction to the order of things that leaves no opening except towards a return to violence. Dull-minded dualism returns to the position prior to the awakening: the malefic world takes on a value much the same as the one it had in the archaic position. It is less important than it was in the sovereignity of a pure violence, which did not have a sense of evil, but the forces of evil never lost their divine value except within the limits of a developed reflection, and their apparently inferior status cannot prevent ordinary humanity from continuing to live under their power. Several forms are possible: a cult of execration of a violence considered to be irreducible can capture the interest of a blind consciousness; and the interest is openly declared if the execration implies a complete opening to evil, evil as such, can reveal to the confused consciousness that it is worth more to it than good. But the different forms of the dualistic attitude never offer anything but a slippery possibility to the mind (which must always answer at the same time to two irreconciliable demands: lift and preserve the order of things). PP80

10.2 A richer possibility, providing adequate displacements within its limits, is given in mediation. PP80

10.3 The major weakness of dualism is that it offers no legitimate place for violence except in the moment of pure transcendence, of rational exclusion of the sensuous world. But the divinity of the good cannot be maintained at that degree of purity; indeed, it falls back into the sensuous world. It is the object, on the part of the believer, of a search for intimate commuication, but this thirst for intimacy will never be quenched. The good is an exclusion of violence and there can be no breaking of the order of separate things, no intimacy, without violence; the god of goodness is limited by right to the violence with which he excludes violence, and he is divine, open to intimacy only insofar as he in fact preserves the old violence within him, which he does not have the right to exclude, and to this extent he is not the god of reason, which is the truth of goodness. In theory this involves a weakening of the moral divine in favor of evil. PP81

10.4 The Mediation of Evil and the Impotence of the Avenging God A first mediation of evil has always been possible. [...I]n the mournful revelation of death [because of a crime against a friend], I am in accord with the divinity of goodness that condems a cruel act. In the divine disorder of crime, I call for the violence that will restore the destroyed order. But in reality it is not violence but crime that has opened divine intimacy to me. And, insofar as the vengeance does not become an extension of an irratinal violence of the crime, it will quickly close that which the crime opened. For only vengeance that is commanded by passion and a taste for untrammeled violence is divine. The restoration of the lawful order is essentially subordinated to profane reality. Thus a first possibility of mediation manifests the exceptionally slippery nature of a god of goodness: he is divine in excluding violence by violence (and he is less so than the excluded violence, which is the necessary mediation of his divinity), but he is divine only insofar as he opposes reason and the good; and if he is a pure rational morality, he owes his remaining divinity to a name; and to a propensity to endure on the part of that which is not destroyed from the outside. PP82

10.5 The Sacrifice of the Divinity. In the second form of the mediation the violence comes to the divinity from the outside. It is the divinity itself that undergoes it. As in the positing of a God of vengeance, crime is necessary for the return of the intimate order. If there was only man, of the order of things, and the moral divinity, there could not be any deep communication between them. Man included in the order of things would not be able both to lift and to preserve that order. The violence of evil must intervene for the order to be lifted through a destruction, but the offered victim is itself the divinity. PP82

10.6 The principle of mediation is given in the sacrifice where the offering is destroyed so as to open a path for the return of the intimate order. But in the mediation of sacrifice the sacrificerÕs act is not, in theory, opposed to the divine order, the nature of whic it extends immediately. However, the crime that a world of the sovereign good has defined as such is external to the moral divinity. The one who undergoes the violence of evil can also be called the mediator, but this is insofar as he renounces himself. The ordinary victim of evil, who invoked the god of vengeance, could not receive this name since he had involuntarily undergone the violence of mediation. But the divinity intentionally invokes crime; mediation is the joint accomplishment of violence and of the being that it rends. PP83

10.7 In reality the sacrifice of the moral divinity is never the unfathomable mystery that one usually imagines. What is sacrificed is what serves, and as soon as sovereignity is reduced to serving the order of things, it can be restored to the divine order only through its destruction, as a thing. This assumes the positing of the divine in a being capable of being really (physically) [JESUS?] done away with. The violence thus lifts and preserves the order of things, irrespective of a vengeance that may or may not be pursued. In death the divinity accepts the sovereign truth of an unleashing that overturns the order of things, but it deflects the violence onto itself and thus no longer serves that order: it ceases to be enslaved to it as things themselves are. PP83

10.8 In this way it elevates the sovereign good, sovereign reason, above the conservative and operative principles of the world of things. or rather, it makes these intelligible forms that which the movement of transcendence made them: an intelligible beyond of being, where it situates intimacy. PP84

10.9 But the sacrifice of the divinity is much more closely tied to the general exclusion of the given violences than was transcendence, whose movement of violence was given independently of evil (in reasonÕs being torn away from the sensuous world). The very violence without which the divinity could not have torn itself away from the order of things is rejected as being something that must cease. The divinity remains divine only through that which it condems. PP84

10.10 The Divine Delivered Over to the Operation. The paradox of a mediation that should not have been does not rest merely on an internal ontradiction. In a general way, it controls the contradiction involved in the lifting and maintenance of the real order. Through mediation the real order is subordinated to the search for lost intimacy, but the profound separation between intimacy and things is succeeded by a multipicity of confucions. IntimacyÐsalvationÐis regarded as a thing characterized by individuality and duration (of the oeration). Duration is given to it as a foundation originating in the concern for enduring that is governed by the operation. At the same time it is posited as the result of operations analogous to those of the real order and pursued in that order. PP85

10.11 In actual fact the intimate order is subordinated to the real world only in a superficial way. Under the sovereignity of morality, all the operations that claim to ensure the return of the intimate order are those that the real world requires: the extensive prohibitions that are given as the precondition for the return are aimed primarily at preserving the disorder of the world of things. In the end, the man of salvation did more to bring the principles of the order of things into the intimate order than to subordinate that productive order to the destructive consumptions of the intimate order. PP85

10.12 So this world of mediation and of works of salvation is led from the start to exceed its limits. Not only are the violences that morality condems set free on all sides, but a tacit debate is initiated between the works of salvation, which serve the real order, and those works that escape it, that strict morality contests, and that dedicate their useful resources to the sumptuary destructions of architecture, liturgy, and contemplative idleness. PP85

10.13 Chapter IV The Rise Of Industry